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G.: Evidence--Disclosure of Defendant's Liability Insurance
CASE COMMENTS
EVIDENCE-DISCLOSURE OF DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY INSURANCE.-

In an action for damages resulting from an automobile accident,
Fs attorney solicited from an apparently disinterested witness on
cross-examination that D had indemnity insurance. This witness's
testimony was contradictory to testimony of some of P's witnesses.
Held, that while the broad general rule is that in a negligence case
evidence showing that D carried indemnity insurance is inadmissible
and constitutes reversible error if admitted, such evidence is admissible to show interest or bias of an apparently disinterested witness if
the jury is properly instructed to consider such testimony as bearing
only on the witness's credibility. Butcher v. Stull, 82 S.E.2d 278
(W. Va. 1954).
In Christiev. Mitchell, 93 W. Va. 200, 116 S.E. 715 (1923), the
court says the effect of letting the jury know that the defendant was
protected by indemnity insurance cannot be wholly cured by the
court's ruling that such question is improper and by instructing
the jury to disregard the answer. Accord, Bradford v. Board of
Education, 128 W. Va. 228, 36 S.E.2d 512 (!945). In short, the
court implies that a new trial is necessary. But Ambrose v. Young,
100 W. Va. 452, 130 S.E. 810 (1925), holds that testimony volunteered by a witness in such a case to the effect that the dclendant was
protected by indemnity insurance is not reversible error where it
clearly appears that counsel for the plaintiff did not solicit such
testimony and could not have anticipated the objectionable answer
of the witness and where the court instructed the jury to disregard
it. So, it is seen that there is some confusion in this state as to just
what the rule is. To further illustrate this point, consider Moorefield v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S.E. 564 (1924), in which it is
said that improper remarks (referring to the fact that the defendant had indemnity insurance) by counsel during the trial and
in the presence of the jury are not cause for reversal if the jury
are properly instructed to disregard them and the court is unable
to see that substantial prejudice resulted. On the other hand,
note the holding in Fleming v. Hartrick, 105 W. Va. 135, 141 S.E.
628 (1928): "This court has held on numerous occasions that the
jury should not in any manner be apprised of the fact that the
defendant in an action for the negligent operation of an automobile is protected by indemnity insurance,, notwithstanding that the
court may instruct the jury not to consider the same in arriving at
a verdict."
Judging from all of these cases we can see that admitting such
evidence may be: (1) reversible error under all circumstances; (2)
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not reversible error if the jury was instructed to disregard it and
the court is unable to see that substantial prejudice resulted; (3)
not reversible error if the examining attorney did not solicit and
could not have anticipated the objectionable answer and the jury
is instructed to disregard it. Other jurisdictions seem to have
the same problem. In both Beatty v. Palmer, 196 Ala. 67, 7] So.
422 (1916), and Spoomick v. Backus Brooks Co., 89 Minn. 354, 94
N.W. 1079 (1903), it is said that admitting such evidence is not
reversible error if the examining attorney did not solicit and could
not have anticipated the answer. The Beatty case says the attorney's
good faith is presumed. It even goes so far as to say that the
question and answer are not sufficient to create bias, which moves
one to ask why require good faith on the part of the attorney?
The instant case comes within a well-recognized exception to
the general rule barring such evidence. This exception providing
that evidence that the defendant is protected by indemnity insurance is admissible and does not constitute reversible error
where it is introduced to show interest or bias on the part of an
apparently disinterested witness seems to be generally accepted in
most jurisdictions. Vindicator Consol. Gold Min. Co. v. Firstbrook,
36 Col. 498, 86 Pac. 313 (1906); Gibson v. Gray Motor Co., 147Minn. 134, 179 N.W. 729 (1920). The reason for this exception
is that the general rule is in conflict with the rule of evidence
allowing the credibility of a witness to be attacked. The courts
have weighed these two rules where they conflict, as here, and have
decided that the latter outweighs the former. 3 WIGMORR, EVIDENCE
§ 282a (3d ed. 1940).
Lynch v. Alderton, 124 W. Va. 446, 20 S.E.2d 657 (1942), held
that it was reversible error to ask the whole jury panel, "Are any
of you officers, employees, agents or stockholders in any liability
insurance company?" This informed the jury indirectly that the
defendant was protected by indemnity insurance. This case may
be distinguished from the instant case by quoting from the Lynch
case: "Such an inquiry might have been proper, as applied to an
individual juror, out of the presence of the balance of the panel,
had the matter been brought to the attention of the trial court,
and reasonable ground therefor shown." Id. at 452, 20 S.E.2d 660.
Elsewhere in the opinion the court refers to the objectionable
qualities of the question under the circumstances in which it was
asked. In the Lynch case the question could have been asked the
individual juror out of the presence of the rest of the panel,
thereby refraining from lodging in the minds of the panel that the
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defendant was protected by indemnity insurance. In the instant
case there was no other way to attack the witness's credibility except
by asking the question in the presence of the jury. On this basis
the two cases are distinguishable.
It is interesting to note that there is another exception to the
general rule. Where the defendant denies control of the injuring
instrumentality, evidence that he carried indemnity insurance to
protect himself if anyone were injured by the instrumentality may
come in to show his control over that instrumentality. Barg v.
Bousfield, 65 Minn. 355, 68 N.W. 45 (1896); Perkins v. Rice, 187
Mass. 28, 72 N.E. 323 (1904). It is hardly likely that the defendant
would carry indemnity insurance on an instrumentality over which
he has no control.
The West Virginia court implies in its opinion that if such
witness was P's witness in chief, it would constitute reversible error
for the indemnity insurance fact to be disclosed, which is to say
that bD should not have brought this particular witness into the
case at all, and having done so, must bear the consequences of it.
G. W. G.
MISTAKE OF LAW-RECOvERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER SUCH MIS-

TAKE.-P borrowed $4,000 from H, giving a negotiable promissory
note secured by a trust deed conveying certain realty. H employed
D, an attorney, for collection purposes and P paid D installments
amounting to $500, receiving receipts from him. D applied this
sum to debts owing him from H. Subsequently P sold the real
property and sought a necessary immediate release of the lien. H
refused to release until the amount withheld by D was credited on
the debt. P then paid an additional $500 to H and received the
release, and later instituted a notice of motion for judgment proceeding against H and D to recover the $500.
D entered a special plea, to which P demurred. The demurrer
was sustained. The matter being submitted on the pleadings,
the trial court entered judgment against H and D. The supreme
court granted a writ of error to D, H having made no defense
below. The court found no contractual basis for the proceeding
against D and reversed, overruling P's demurrer. Case v. Shepherd,
84 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1954).
D's special plea contended that P showed no contract, express
or implied, between D and P and that the payment to H constituted
a voluntary payment made with full knowledge of all material
facts at the time and no recovery should be permitted.
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